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Abstract
Real-world contests are often "unfair" in the sense that outperforming all rivals may not
be enough to be the winner, because some contestants are favored by the allocation rule,
while others are handicapped. Examples of such contests can be inter alia found in the
area of litigation and procurement.
This paper analyzes discriminatory contests with a handicap for one of the partic-
ipants. We first characterize the equilibrium strategies, provide closed form solutions,
and illustrate the additional strategic issues arising through the unfairness of contests.
We then tackle the issue of the optimal degree of unfairness. From a social point of
view, the following trade-oﬀ arises: On the one hand, the prize may be awarded to an
inferior contestant. But on the other hand, unfair contests lead to a lower overall eﬀort
of the contestants and hence reduces ineﬃcient rent-seeking. We characterize situations
in which it is optimal for an authority to either stipulate a fair contest, an interior degree
of unfairness or even an infinitely unfair contest where the prize is directly awarded to
one of the contestants.
Keywords: All-pay auctions, contests, asymmetric allocation rule, rent-seeking games,
asymmetric information
JEL-Classification: D44, D88
1 Introduction
Motivation and results One apparently desirable feature of contests, games in
which several parties exert costly eﬀort to compete with each other to secure a prize,
a rent, or a government contract, is that they should be fair in the sense that the one
who performs best should be the winner. In reality, however, contests are often "unfair"
because one contestant is favored as he need not outperform his competitors to be the
winner. Accordingly, other contestants may be handicapped, since outperforming their
rivals may not be enough to win.
In reality, allocation rules are often asymmetric in the sense described above. For ex-
ample, in German procurement auctions, although local authorities are in general obliged
to choose the firm with the lowest bid, there is a clause according to which it can award
the contract to a local firm when this firm’s bid is not more than 5 per cent higher than
the lowest bid. Under the realistic assumption that preparing a bid itself is costly and
that (part of) these costs cannot be recovered independent of which party is awarded
the contract, this resembles an unfair contest as described above. As a second example,
consider litigation where it is costly for the plaintiﬀ and the defendant to prevail, inde-
pendent of the actual outcome of the trial (e.g. by searching for favorable evidence and/or
by hiring a lawyer). Under the ”in dubio pro reo”-rule in criminal law, a defendant will
only be convicted if the evidence against him is ”abundant”, i.e. if his lawyer presents
considerably less or worse evidence than the prosecutor. Again, our model can be used
to analyze such situations. Furthermore, assume that an enterprise wishes to hire a con-
sulting firm, and suppose that firm A has done some excellent in-house consulting before.
Then, we often observe in reality that a potential entrant B is awarded the contract only
if the quality of its proposal is considerably above the quality of A’s proposal. As long
as preparing a proposal is itself costly, this can again be interpreted as an unfair contest
in our sense. Finally, when deciding on job promotion, firms often apply some sort of
seniority rule which implies that a junior candidate might not get the job although he
has performed better than his senior counterpart.
In the first part of the paper, we fully characterize the equilibrium strategies of an
unfair two−player discriminatory contest (all-pay auction) using a framework where con-
testants have private information concerning the value of the prize to them. We show
that there exists a unique pure strategy Bayesian Nash Equilibrium and provide a closed
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form solution of the respective set of first order conditions. With respect to eﬃciency,
it is generally possible that the handicapped contestant exerts more eﬀort than the fa-
vored contestant if their valuations are identical, we show that it is not possible for
the handicapped contestant to win the contest when his valuation is lower than the fa-
vored contestant’s valuation. Hence, an ineﬃcient allocation of the prize can only result
when the favored contestant is the winner although he has the lower valuation. We then
illustrate the additional strategic aspects which arise through the introduction of the
asymmetry for uniformly distributed valuations.
In the second part of the paper, we go one step further by asking "What is the optimal
degree of unfairness?". Of course, unfair contests may lead to welfare losses whenever a
first best requires the prize to be awarded to the ”best” contestant. In the procurement
example, it will generally be socially optimal to award the contract to the firm with the
lowest (marginal) costs. A similar reasoning holds for the other examples mentioned
above. The higher the degree of unfairness, the higher the chances of awarding the prize
to an inferior contestant and so one obvious drawback from unfair contests is allocative
ineﬃciency.
But on the other hand, there may also be reasons in favor of an unfair contest design.
Personal relationships may oﬀer stochastic signals on a contestant’s capabilities besides
the quality of his proposal, and supporting local firms may be reasonable at least from
the local authority’s point of view. In our paper, we neglect these aspects by assuming
that contestants are ex ante symmetric. But even then, an unfair contest can be superior
because of the well-known fact that the private incentive to exert eﬀort in a contest is often
far beyond the social value of eﬀort.1 For instance, the eﬀort exerted for the preparation
of proposals in procurement contests may simply be waste from a social point of view.2
1In fact, it has been argued that the total prize in a rent-seeking contest may be dissipated in the
contestants’ attempt of securing the prize (see Tullock (1980)). Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries (1999) have
shown, that this result can only occur for some realizations of strategies in a mixed strategy equilibrium
but not in expectation.
2Although this is the assumption we maintain throughout the paper, we are of course aware of the
fact that there are also examples of contests where more eﬀort is, at least partly, socially valuable. For
example, in the case of R&D races, it is often argued that duplication of eﬀort may be socially desirable
as it may lead to innovation and technological progress. Furthermore, in sports contests, more aggregate
eﬀort is generally considered a desirable feature as it increases suspense as well as the overall quality
of the contest (see e.g. Szymanski (2003)). Accordingly, alternative objective functions of the contest
designer have been considered in the literature, including maximizing i) total expected eﬀort and ii) the
expected value of the highest eﬀort level (see e.g. Gavious, Moldovanu, and Sela (2002) and Moldovanu
and Sela (2002)).
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In our paper, total expected eﬀort may decrease in the degree of unfairness, which is the
potential advantage of unfair contests so that a trade-oﬀ arises between ex-post eﬃciency
and the waste of resources. Given this trade-oﬀ, we illustrate that it may be optimal for
the contest designer to stipulate a fair contest, an infinitely unfair contest or a contest
with an interior degree of unfairness.
Literature It is well-known that discriminatory contests are strategically equivalent
to all-pay auctions. In all-pay auctions, each bidder has to pay his bid regardless of
whether he wins the auction or not, and in discriminatory contests, each contestant
bears his eﬀort costs no matter if he wins or not. Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries (1996)
provide a complete analysis of the all-pay auction under complete information. In a
framework of asymmetric information, Krishna and Morgan (1997) extend the classic
model by Milgrom and Weber (1982) with aﬃliated signals to first- and second price
all-pay auctions. Lizzeri and Persico (2000) analyze under which conditions there exist
unique pure strategy equilibria in general auction games, including the all-pay auction.3
Amann and Leininger (1996) and Maskin and Riley (2000) consider auctions in which
contestants are asymmetric in the sense that the valuations of each bidder are drawn from
diﬀerent distributions. This also implies that the bidder with the highest valuation does
no longer win the object with certainty. While Maskin and Riley (2000) confine attention
to winner-pay auctions, our paper is more related to Amann and Leininger (1996) as
they analyze the all-pay auction. Moreover, we adopt and extend their approach for
determining the equilibrium bidding strategies from a system of diﬀerential equations.
As stated above, in all these papers and contrary to our model, the winner of the auction
is the high bidder.
In contrast, there are a few papers analyzing contests with handicaps: Konrad (2002)
assumes that an incumbent needs to spend less resources than his rival to win a discrim-
inatory contest. However, he restricts attention to complete information, so that only
mixed strategy equilibria exist. In the context of bribery games, Lien (1990) and Clark
and Riis (2000) consider an all-pay auction where two players compete for a government
contract awarded by a corrupt oﬃcial. In Lien (1990), the players are ex-ante symmetric
and the introduction of a handicap unambiguously reduces allocative eﬃciency. Clark
3The issue of existence of pure-strategy equilibria in a more general class of simultaneous games of
asymmetric information is also extensively analyzed in Athey (2001).
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and Riis (2000) extend the situation to ex-ante asymmetric bidders (with respect to their
bidding costs) and show that the oﬃcial can increase his expected revenue by introducing
unfairness in our sense. Bernardo, Talley, and Welch (2000) consider a litigation game
in which each litigant’s piece of evidence is unequally weighted by the court (in the legal
jargon, the court is said to employ a ”presumption” in favor of one party). They consider
the eﬀect of such a presumption on shirking incentives at an earlier stage of the game. In
contrast to our approach, they model this as a non-discriminatory contest (i.e. ”Tullock”
contest), where the outcome is stochastic even for given eﬀorts levels (see also Kohli and
Singh (1999)).
Furthermore, our paper discusses an additional dimension concerning the issue of
contest design, and other choice variables so far considered in the literature include i)
the number of contestants which are invited to play the contest (Baye, Kovenock, and
de Vries (1993), Taylor (1995), Fullerton and McAfee (1999), and Che and Gale (2002)),
ii) whether there should be only one prize (for the winner), or whether several prizes
should be awarded (Moldovanu and Sela (2001), Moldovanu and Sela (2002)), and iii)
the desirability of imposing a (symmetric) bid cap (Gavious, Moldovanu, and Sela (2002)
and Che and Gale (1998)).
Finally, using a diﬀerent setup, Bolton and Farrell (1990) analyze the advantages
and disadvantages of decentralization, where two firms which have private information
about their production costs in each period decide whether or not to sink costs to enter
a natural-monopoly market. The basic trade-oﬀ is similar to ours: Decentralization tends
to induce only a low cost firm end up to enter while a high cost firm prefers to stay out
and thus tends to use information eﬃciently. However, this process only evolves over
time, so that it comes with ineﬃcient delay or duplication of eﬀort as there are periods
where neither or both firms sink costs in order to enter the market. On the other hand,
centralization means that an uninformed agency grants the monopoly right to one of the
firms so that there is the chance that it will pick the high cost firm.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2 the basic model is
presented. In section 3 we analyze the equilibrium of the contest game and derive our
main theoretical results and in section 4 we discuss a numerical example. Section 5 is
concerned with the optimal degree of unfairness, and section 6 concludes.
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2 The Model
Basic Setup We consider a discriminatory contest (all-pay auction) where 2 risk-
neutral contestants indexed i = 1, 2 compete for a single prize to be awarded. Each
contestant has valuation vi ∈ [0, 1] for the prize which drawn from a common distribution
function F (v) ∈ C1 satisfying F (0) = 0 where the density function F 0(v) is positive valued
on (0, 1). The realization of vi (contestant i’s ”type”) is private information to contestant
i. Each contestant can influence his chances of winning the prize by exerting eﬀort which
is denoted by bi. In what follows, we analyze equilibria in which the eﬀort strategy of
contestant i is a function of his type, i.e. bi : [0, 1]→ <+0 .
The specific feature of this contest is the allocation rule: Denoting by W ∈ {1, 2} the
identity of the winner, we have
W = 1⇔ b1 > t · b2 and W = 2⇔ b2 > 1
t
· b1 (1)
where a coin is flipped in case that b1 = t · b2 holds so that each contestant wins with
probability 1
2
. Thus, contestant 1 wins the contest only if he exerts at least t-times as
much eﬀort as contestant 2, while contestant 2 wins if he exerts at least 1
t
-times as much
eﬀort as contestant 1. Without loss of generality we confine attention to the case t ≥ 1.
Therefore, contestants 1 and 2 will be referred to as the ”handicapped” and the ”favored”
contestant, respectively.4 The value of t is commonly known in the contest game and we
will refer to the case t = 1 as a ”fair” contest; in this case our model is equivalent to a
standard two-player all-pay auction with private values.
Payoﬀs Following the setup of the model, payoﬀs for given eﬀort levels b1 and b2
are
π1(b1, b2, v1; t) =



v1 − b1 if b1 > tb2
1
2
v1 − b1 if b1 = tb2
−b1 if b1 < tb2
(2)
4Note that the asymmetry here refers to the allocation rule. This is diﬀerent to ”asymmetric auctions”
in the sense of Amann and Leininger (1996) and Maskin and Riley (2000), where the valuations v1 and
v2 are drawn from diﬀerent distributions.
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and
π2(b1, b2, v2; t) =



v2 − b2 if b2 > 1t b1
1
2
v2 − b2 if b2 = 1t b1
−b2 if b2 < 1t b1
. (3)
Finally for t given, expected payoﬀs are5
Π1(·) = v1 · Pr(b1 > t · b2(v2))− b1 (4)
and
Π2(·) = v2 · Pr(b2 > 1
t
· b1(v1))− b2. (5)
The timing of the game is as follows (see also figure 1 below): At stage 1, the authority
chooses t. At stage 2, each contestant’s valuation for the contract is determined by a
nature’s move and privately revealed to that contestant. At stage 3, the contest is played
where t is given and commonly known. At stage 4, after observing the eﬀort choices, the
prize is awarded by the authority according to the allocation rule.
 
1 2 3 4 
Authority chooses t Nature 
determines 
 v1 and v2 
Effort choices  
b1 and b2  
  
Authority 
awards 
prize 
 
 
Stage 
Figure 1: Sequence of Events
5Since equilibrium eﬀort strategies will be continuous, the probability of a tie is zero.
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3 Equilibrium Analysis
3.1 Uniqueness and existence of equilibrium at the contest stage
Since this is a static game with incomplete information, the equilibrium concept used is
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE). A vector of eﬀort levels (b∗1(v1), b
∗
2(v2)) is a BNE if
the following set of conditions is satisfied:
Πi(b
∗
i (vi), b
∗
j(vj); t) ≥ Πi(bi, b∗j(vj); t) for all vi ∈ [0, 1], and bi ∈ <+0 . (6)
In equilibrium, no contestant must be able to increase his expected payoﬀ by choosing
an eﬀort strategy other than b∗i (vi), given that the opponent adheres to his equilibrium
strategy. The following definition proves useful for further reference:
Definition 1 Consider a set A ⊂ R and a function z : A → <. Then define: Dz :=
{a ∈ A : z(a) ∈ <+}.
The restricted domain Dz contains only those elements a ∈ A whose image z(a)
is positive. We can then state the following result concerning the properties of the
equilibrium eﬀort strategies:
Lemma 1 (Equilibrium Eﬀort Strategies) b∗i : Dbi → (0, bi(1)] where i = 1, 2 is an
increasing bijection between non-empty subsets of [0, 1] and diﬀerentiable almost every-
where.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The Lemma simply says that each contestant’s equilibrium strategy is a well-behaved
and monotonically increasing function in his type.
Uniqueness of Equilibrium We first show that an equilibrium is unique whenever
it exists. The issue of existence is addressed below. Note that Lemma 1 also ensures
existence of the inverse mapping ρi : (0, b
∗
i (1)]→ Dbi, i.e. ρi(b) ≡ b−1i (b) is the valuation
contestant i must have in order to choose eﬀort level b. Equipped with this result we
can now characterize the equilibrium eﬀort strategies in more detail. The maximization
problem for contestant 1 when contestant 2 is playing some strategy b2(v2) is given by
max
b1
v1 · Pr(b1 > t · b2(v2))− b1 = max
b1
v1 · F (ρ2(
b1
t
))− b1, (7)
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while for contestant 2, when contestant 1 is playing strategy b1(v1) we have
max
b2
v2 · Pr(b2 > 1
t
· b1(v1))− b2 = max
b2
v2 · F (ρ1(t · b2))− b2. (8)
The first order conditions of these maximization problems are given by the following
system of ordinary first order diﬀerential equations:
v1 · F 0(ρ2(
b1(v1)
t
)) · ρ02(
b1(v1)
t
) · 1
t
= 1. (9)
v2 · F 0(ρ1(t · b2(v2))) · ρ01(t · b2(v2)) · t = 1. (10)
For a given set of initial conditions, this system determines a unique trajectory of eﬀort
strategies. That there is only a single pair of initial conditions (such that a solution to
Eqns. (9) and (10) is indeed unique) follows from the subsequent results concerning the
properties of the equilibrium eﬀort distributions Gi=1,2 := F (ρi(b
∗
i )) : DGi → (0, 1]:6
Lemma 2 (Equilibrium Eﬀort Distributions) In any BNE, the eﬀort distributions
G1 and G2 have the following properties:
(i) DG1 = (0, b
∗
1(1)] and DG2 = (0, b
∗
2(1)] where b
∗
1(1) = t · b∗2(1).
(ii) Gi is continuous and strictly monotone increasing ∀i = 1, 2.
(iii) If Gi(0) > 0, then Gj 6=i(0) = 0.
(iv) There is a single set of admissible initial conditions.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Part (i) of the Lemma characterizes one main diﬀerence of our model compared to the
standard model with t = 1. Clearly, it can never be optimal for (the favored) contestant
2 to exert more than 1
t
-times the maximum eﬀort of (the handicapped) contestant 1 since
he already wins with probability one when choosing b2 = 1t ·b1(1). Part ii) follows from the
fact that, in equilibrium, eﬀort distributions must ensure that no contestant can increase
his expected profit by choosing a lower eﬀort level while leaving the probability of winning
the contest unchanged. Part iii) says that only one contestant’s eﬀort function can have
an atom at zero. Intuitively, this follows from the fact that, given that one contestant’s
eﬀort function has an atom at zero, the other contestant would always be better of by
choosing a strictly positive eﬀort level whenever his own valuation is positive. As one
6Similar statements for the case t = 1 have for example been derived by Amann and Leininger (1996).
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consequence, the coexistence of diﬀerent sets of admissible initial conditions is ruled out
as stated in part iv).7
Existence of Equilibrium Rather than modifying equations (9) and (10) directly,
we extend the method adopted by Amann and Leininger (1996) who have analyzed the
case t = 1 for valuations v1 and v2 drawn from diﬀerent distributions. The advantage
of this method is that it simplifies the problem of simultaneously solving a system of
diﬀerential equations into a sequential procedure.
Consider a bijection k(v1; t) which maps every type of contestant 1 onto that type of
contestant 2 whose equilibrium eﬀort level is 1/t- times as much as contestant 10s so that
k(v1; t) = ρ2(
b∗1(v1)
t
). (11)
Analogously, k−1(v2; t) = ρ1(t · b∗2(v2)) gives that type of contestant 1 who will choose
t-times as much eﬀort as contestant 2 when his type is v2. Note that due to our previous
results, Eqn. (11) defines indeed a bijection between the domains Db1 and Db2 of the two
equilibrium strategies which is diﬀerentiable almost everywhere. It turns out that rewrit-
ing the first order conditions with k(v1; t) and a separation of dependent and independent
variables provides a closed form solution for k(·):
Lemma 3 Define H(x) :=
R 1
x
F 0(y)
y
dy so that d
dx
H(·) = −F 0(x)
x
< 0. Then we have:
i) k(v1; t) = H−1(tH(v1)) satisfying ddtk(v1; ·) < 0 and k(v1; 1) = v1.
ii) k−1(v2; t) = H−1(1tH(v2)) satisfying
d
dt
k(v2; ·) > 0 and k−1(v2; 1) = v2.
iii) limt→∞ k−1(v2; t) = 1 and limt→∞ k(v1; t) = 0 which implies that contestant 2’s (con-
testant 1’s) probability of winning tends to 1 (0) as t→∞.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Equipped with a closed form solution for k(·) and its inverse, a simple quadrature
provides us with the equilibrium strategies:
Theorem 1 There exists a unique pure-strategy Bayesian Nash-Equilibrium in which
7This follows from the no-crossing property of equilibrium bid functions as established by Lizzeri and
Persico (2000).
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contestant 1 (the handicapped contestant) chooses
b∗1(v1) =
v1Z
max{0,k−1(0;t)}
t · k(V ; t)F 0(V )dV (12)
and in which contestant 2 (the favored contestant) chooses
b∗2(v2) =
b∗1(k
−1(v2; t))
t
. (13)
Proof. See Appendix D.
3.2 The impact of t > 1 on ex-post eﬃciency
In our framework, the allocation of the prize does not only depend on who exerts more
eﬀort but also on the identity of a contestant. Hence, we can not exclude that the
prize is awarded to a contestant whose valuation is lower than that of his competitor.
Furthermore, without further information on the distribution F (·), one can not say which
contestant will exert more eﬀort when valuations are identical. However, we can show
that the handicapped contestant 1 will generically not win the contest if his valuation is
lower. This means that, even if being handicapped induces him to choose higher eﬀort
levels for some realizations of v1, this can never outweigh his handicap. It follows that
an ineﬃcient allocation of the prize can only result when (the favored) contestant 2 wins
the auction although he has a lower valuation. This is expressed in the following result,
where W ∗ ∈ {1, 2} denotes the identity of the winner in equilibrium:
Theorem 2 i) In equilibrium, there can only exist the case where v1 > v2 but W ∗ = 2,
while the case where v2 > v1 but W ∗ = 1 does not occur with positive probability.
ii) The probability of an ineﬃcient allocation is therefore given by
p∗(t) :=
1Z
0
(F (v1)− F (k(v1; t)))F 0(v1)dv1 (14)
satisfying p∗(1) = 0, d
dt
p∗(·) > 0 and limt→∞ p∗(t) = 12 .
Proof. See Appendix E.
10
For each v1, contestant 1 has the higher valuation with probability F (v1) but will
be the winner only when v2 < k(v1; t) which occurs with probability F (k(v1; t)). It
is well known that the case t = 1 (the standard all-pay auction) allocates the prize
eﬃciently since equilibrium eﬀort strategies are strictly increasing in the valuations so
that the contestant with the highest valuation will choose the highest eﬀort level. When t
increases, exerting the highest eﬀort level does not guarantee victory so that the allocation
will be distorted. As the handicap goes to infinity, contestant 2 becomes the winner with
probability 1, while he has the higher valuation only with probability 1
2
since F (·) is the
same for both contestants.
4 An example: Uniform distribution
Equilibrium Strategies To illustrate our main results, we consider the case where
the vi are uniformly distributed, i.e. F (v) = v. Applying Lemma 3, we get H(x) =R 1
x
1
y
dy = − lnx, so that k(·) is then implicitly given by − ln k = − ln vt1 which leads to
k(v1; t) = v
t
1. Substituting in Eqn. (45) yields
b∗1(v1; t) =
Z v1
0
t · V tdV = t
t+ 1
vt+11 (15)
and, by definition of k(v1; t),
b∗2(v2; t) =
b∗1(k
−1(v2))
t
=
1
t+ 1
v
(t+1)/t
2 . (16)
The equilibrium eﬀort distributions are G1(b∗1; t) = ρ1(b
∗
1; t) = ((
1+t
t
)b∗1)
1
t+1and G2(b∗2; t) =
ρ2(b
∗
2; t) = ((1 + t)b
∗
2)
t
t+1 which both satisfy Gi(0) = 0 (and hence are atomless) and
Gi(b
∗(1)) = 1. Clearly, b∗i (vi; t) is increasing in vi, also satisfying b
∗
i (0) = 0. Moreover,
the equilibrium eﬀort strategies satisfy the support constraint b∗1(1) =
t
t+1
= t·b∗2(1) = 11+t
as required by Lemma 2.
For the comparative statics with respect to t, let us first consider two polar cases: For
t = 1, we have b∗i (vi; 1) =
1
2
v2i for i = 1, 2 which is simply the standard symmetric equilib-
rium of the two player all-pay auction with private values. If t becomes large, equilibrium
bids converge to zero, i.e. limt→∞ tt+1v
t+1
1 = limt→∞
1
t+1
v
(t+1)/t
2 = 0. Intuitively, when the
handicap becomes infinitely strong, then there is no point for the handicapped contestant
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to exert eﬀort at all as he will never be the winner of the contest. Analogously for the
favored contestant, an arbitrarily small amount of eﬀort ensures winning the object with
certainty.
Interestingly, the results for intermediate values of t are not as clear-cut. As an
illustration, figure 1 shows contestant 2’s equilibrium strategy b∗2(v2; t) as a function of t
(where t ≥ 1) for v2 = 13 :
107.552.5
0.06
0.05
0.04
0.03
t
Figure 2: b∗2(v2 =
1
3
) as a function of t.
As the marginal cost from increasing bi is always equal to 1, the intuition behind this
non-monotonicity result can best be explained by looking at the marginal benefit, which
is denoted by MBi. We confine attention to an illustration for contestant 2; the case is
analogous for contestant 1. Generally, when t increases by ∆t, there are two eﬀects which
will be analyzed subsequently:
1. contestant 2 wins the contest not only when b2 > 1t b1 but already when b2 >
1
t+∆t
b1
(the ”direct eﬀect”).
2. as t changes, also b∗1(v1; t) changes by
d
dt
b∗1(v1; ·)·∆t and this changes the distribution
of eﬀort G1(·) which contestant 2 faces (the ”indirect eﬀect”).
Direct eﬀect By setting t = et, we fix b∗1(v1;et) and look how a change in t aﬀects
the marginal benefit from increasing b2. In this case, we can write expected benefit as
v2 · Pr(b2 > 1t b∗1(v1;et)) = v2 · ρ1(tb2;et) so that MB2(tb2;et) at the equilibrium level b∗2 is
MB2(tb
∗
2;et) = ddb2 (v2 · ρ1(tb∗2;et)). Taking the derivative w.r.t. t and then substituting
back et = t we get
d
dt
MB2(·) = 1
(t+ 1) t
> 0 for all v2 ∈ [0, 1] and t ≥ 1. (17)
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The direct eﬀect unambiguously increases contestant 2’s marginal benefit and thus ceteris
paribus also increase equilibrium eﬀort, because he wins for more realizations of v1 due
to the more advantageous allocation rule.
Indirect eﬀect For the indirect eﬀect, we fix the allocation rule at t = et and analyze
the eﬀect of a change of t on b∗1(·) and thus on the distribution of equilibrium eﬀort levels
G1(·) which contestant 2 faces. For this case we can write expected benefit as v2 ·Pr(b2 >
1
ht b
∗
1(v1; t)) = v2 · ρ1(etb2; t) so that MB2(etb2; t) at b∗2 is MB2(etb∗2; t) = ddb2 (v2 · ρ1(etb∗2; t)).
Taking the derivative w.r.t. t and then substituting back et = t, we get
d
dt
MB2(·) = −(ln v2) t+ ln v2 + 1 + t
2 + t
t (t+ 1)2
≶ 0 (18)
which is positive (negative) for v2 < (>)e
− t+1+t
2
t+1 where 0 < e−
t+1+t2
t+1 < 1 all t > 1.
In order to understand the intuition behind this eﬀect, we have to check how diﬀerent
types of contestant 1 react to a change in t: Define tmaxi (vi) ∈ argmaxt b∗i (vi, t) which
leads to
tmax1 (v1) =
1
2 ln v1
µ
− ln v1 −
q¡
ln2 v1 − 4 ln v1
¢¶
(19)
which is increasing in v1 as
d
dv1
tmax1 (v1) = −
1
(ln v1) v1
p
((ln v1) (ln v1 − 4))
> 0. (20)
Moreover, tmax1 (v1) = 1 ⇔ v1 = e−
1
2 . Finally, limv1→1 t
max
1 (v1) = ∞, so that b∗1(v1; t) is
monotone decreasing in t for 0 < v1 ≤ e−
1
2 , and concave in t with an interior maximum
at tmax1 (v1) for e
− 1
2 < v1 < 1.
Thus, for all v1, at some point the handicap becomes too strong, so that it is optimal
to ”give up” and exert less eﬀort. But those types with v1 > e−
1
2 are at least willing to
”fight” against the stronger handicap by increasing b1 as long as t is not yet too large.
How does this impact on the indirect eﬀect on MB2 in Eqn. (18)? From the definition
of k(·) it follows that in equilibrium, contestant 2 wins whenever v1 < k−1(v2) = v
1
t
2 . It
follows that when v2 is high, contestant 2 will be the winner for most realizations of v1
and so when t increases, his incentive to increase b2 to win for even more realizations
of v1 is relatively low. Therefore, the expression in (18) is negative. On the other hand
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when v2 is low, contestant 2 has an incentive to exert more eﬀort as this allows to win
against some of those types of contestant 1 for which d
dt
b∗1(·) < 0 holds.
Clearly, the total eﬀect is just the sum of the direct and the indirect eﬀect the following
figure illustrates them for v2 = 13(direct eﬀect = dotted line, the indirect eﬀect = dashed
line, total eﬀect = solid line):
Allocation Ex Post Concerning the allocation of the object, recall that for the
uniform distribution case we have k(v1; t) = vt1 so that from Theorem 2, the probability
of misallocation is given by
p∗(t) ≡
1Z
0
¡
v1 − vt1
¢
dv1 =
t− 1
2(t+ 1)
(21)
yielding p∗(1) = 0, d
dt
p∗(·) = 1
(t+1)2
> 0 and limt→∞ p∗(t) = 12 . For each v1, contestant
1 has the higher valuation with Pr(v2 < v1) = v1, but is the winner only with Pr(v2 <
k(v1; t) = v
t
1.
5 The optimal degree of unfairness
After having analyzed the equilibrium of the continuation game in which contestants
choose their eﬀort levels for a given level of unfairness, t, we now determine the level
of t which an authority should set in trying to minimize social costs. To make things
concrete, let’s assume that the prize is a contract for a public service which grants some
monopoly power to the winner and firms can spend resources to be awarded this contract.
From a social point of view, these resources spent are a pure waste as their use is not
productive. The overall value of this monopoly right to each contestant will generally
depend on (privately known) marginal costs of production. In such a setting, it seems
reasonable to assume that the value of the contract to a contestant is the higher, the
lower his marginal costs.
5.1 The benefits and costs of unfair contests
Given the properties of the stage game equilibrium at the continuation stage, the author-
ity’s goal is to minimize expected social costs associated with the allocation of the prize.
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As explained in the introduction, there are two types of social costs - the contestants’
(socially useless) eﬀorts spent in competing for the monopoly right, and potential ex-post
ineﬃciencies as this monopoly right might be awarded to the contestant with the higher
marginal cost. The introduction of a handicap might well reduce wasteful eﬀort spending
(we will refer to this as the benefits of unfairness) while we already saw in Theorem 2
that any handicap induces allocative ineﬃciencies (we will refer to this as the costs of
unfairness).
Benefits The total eﬀort spending in the contest is given by
Σ(t) ≡ E[b∗1(v1; t)] +E[b∗2(v2; t)] (22)
Although it is clearly plausible that there is a positive relationship between the con-
testants’ eﬀort costs and the social costs of the rent seeking activity, they do not neces-
sarily have to be identical. For our specific example, private eﬀort costs may simply be
the disutility of eﬀort, while the social costs might also include forgone benefits from other
potential activities which were not carried out as each contestant spends his resources
in competing for the contract. Therefore, we will assume that the total eﬀort enters the
objective function of the authority via some function Ψ(Σ(t)) satisfying Ψ0(·) > 0 and
Ψ(0) = 0.
Costs As we have seen above in Theorem 2, the disadvantage of choosing an unfair
contest design is that the monopoly right is not necessarily awarded eﬃciently. Whenever
the favored contestant is awarded the contract although he has the lower valuation, this
reduces the private surplus by v ≡ |v2 − v1|. There is also a social loss as it is in the
authority’s interest to award the contract to the contestant with the lower marginal cost
(for example, in the simplest monopoly model with linear demand, the monopoly price
is increasing in his marginal costs of production, see e.g. Tirole (1988, p. 66)). However,
following the reasoning above, private and social loss need not necessarily to be identical
as also consumer surplus may have to be taken into account.
We therefore assume that v enters the objective function of the social planner via a
function φ(v) satisfying φ0(·) > 0 and φ(0) = 0. It then follows that the expected welfare
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loss resulting from an ineﬃcient allocation of the prize is given by
Π(t) ≡
Z 1
0
v1Z
k(v1;t)
φ(v)F 0(v2)dv2F 0(v1)dv1. (23)
The lower bound of the inner integral is k(v1; t) which, recall, gives that type of (the
favored) contestant 2 who chooses 1
t
-times of the eﬀort level which contestant 1 would
choose if his type were v1. Thus, contestant 1 loses the contest whenever contestants 2’s
type is larger than k(v1; t). However, this is only socially undesirable as long as v2 < v1
which explains the upper bound of the inner integral. As for the outer integral, the
authority has to take expectations over v1.
Social costs Given our previous discussion, the authority’s objective is to minimize
the following social cost function
SC(t) = Ψ(t) +Π(t). (24)
by choice of t. In general, the optimal level of unfairness denoted by t∗ will depend on the
nature of Ψ(·) and φ(·). The properties of the social cost function (and its constituents)
can be summarized as follows:
Lemma 4 (i) dΠ(t)
dt
> 0 ∀t ∈ (1,∞). (ii) limt→1 dSCdt = 0. (iii) limt→∞
dSC
dt
= 0.
Proof. See Appendix F.
Part (i) simply says that the social loss due to an ineﬃcient allocation of the contest
strictly increases in t for any t bounded away from 1 or infinity. But as both, marginal
costs (dΠ
dt
) and marginal benefits (dΨ
dt
) vanish at the boundary (see part (ii)), it follows that
corner solutions with either t∗ = 1 or t∗ = ∞ may well emerge. In the first case, social
costs from ineﬃcient allocation are so high that the authority prefers a fair contest. In
the second case, the rent-seeking eﬀect of wasting socially valuable eﬀort dominates, and
the authority actually awards the project to one contestant without procuring a contest
at all. In all other cases, an interior solution with 1 < t∗ <∞ arises. In the following we
return to the example of uniformly distributed types (F (v) = v) to provide examples for
Ψ and Φ that exhibit both corner solutions interior optimal degrees of unfairness.
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5.2 Example revisited: Uniform distribution
Given the equilibrium eﬀorts as in (15) and (16), expected equilibrium eﬀorts are now
given by
E[b∗1(v1; t)] =
1Z
0
t
t+ 1
vt+11 dv1 =
t
(t+ 1)(t+ 2)
(25)
E[b∗1(v1; t)] =
1Z
0
1
t+ 1
v
(t+1)/t
2 dv2 =
t
(t+ 1)(2t+ 1)
(26)
Linear Case Assume first that Ψ(Σ(t)) = x · Σ(t) where x > 0 and φ(v) = v. Thus,
social costs of excessive eﬀort and ineﬃcient allocation are linear in the private costs,
where x can be interpreted as the relative weight put on the loss from excessive eﬀort.
In this case, we have
SC(t) = x · 3t
(2t+ 1) (t+ 2)
+
t2 − 2t+ 1
3 (2t+ 1) (t+ 2)
=
9xt− 2t+ t2 + 1
3 (2t+ 1) (t+ 2)
. (27)
as
Π(t) =
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯ 1Z
0
v1Z
vt1
(v2 − v1)dv2dv1
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯ =
¯¯¯¯
¯¯
1Z
0
(−1
2
v21 −
1
2
¡
v21
¢t
+ vt+11 )dv1
¯¯¯¯
¯¯
=
t2 − 2t+ 1
3 (2t+ 1) (t+ 2)
. (28)
Taking the derivative with respect to t and simplifying yields
d
dt
SC(t) = −3 (t− 1) (t+ 1) (2x− 1)
(2t+ 1)2 (t+ 2)2
(29)
which is weakly positive (negative) for x < (>)1
2
. Thus in the linear case, the objective
function is monotone which leads to corner solutions. If the social loss from wasting eﬀort
is small compared to the loss from ineﬃciently awarding the prize, then the authority
optimally stipulates a fair contest with t = 1 (see figure 3a). Hence, there is no allocation
ineﬃciency at all. On the other hand, when the social loss from eﬀort is high, then the
authority will make the contest arbitrarily unfair which is equivalent to either randomly
awarding the prize to one of the contestants, or to completely forestalling entry for the
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handicapped contestant (see figure 3b). As a consequence, the authority will choose the
”false” contestant with probability 1
2
.
108642
0.1
0.08
0.06
0.04
x
y
Fig. 4a: Exp. Soc. Loss, x = 0.1.
108642
0.325
0.3
0.275
0.25
x
y
Fig. 4b: Exp. Soc. Loss, x = 1.
Quadratic Case In this case, we continue to assume that the social cost of ineﬃcient
allocation is equal to the private costs, but that social costs of excessive eﬀort is quadratic
in the private costs, i.e. φ(v) = v and Ψ(Σ(t)) = (Σ(t))2. Social costs are then
SC(t) =
µ
3t
(2t+ 1) (t+ 2)
¶2
+
t2 − 2t+ 1
3 (2t+ 1) (t+ 2)
=
21t2 + t3 + 2t4 + t+ 2
4 (2t+ 1)2 (t+ 2)2
. (30)
As is illustrated in figure 4 below, this gives rise for an interior solution at t∗ ≈ 3.1861,
so that a finite degree of unfairness is optimally chosen by the authority:
108642
0.12
0.1175
0.115
0.1125
0.11
0.1075
0.105
x
y
Figure 5: An interior solution for t∗.
We briefly summarize our results for these two examples as follows:
Result 3 i) In the linear case where Ψ(Σ(t)) = x · Σ(t) and φ(v) = v, the optimal level
t∗ chosen by the authority is given by
t∗ =



1 for x ≤ 1
2
∞ for x ≥ 1
2
.
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ii) In the quadratic case where φ(v) = v and Ψ(Σ(t)) = (Σ(t))2, the authorities optimal
policy is an interior degree of unfairness (t∗ ≈ 3.1861).
6 Conclusion
We have analyzed a two-player discriminatory contest which is potentially unfair, as an
authority has the option of setting an asymmetric allocation rule which is favoring one
contestant while handicapping the other. We show that there exists a unique pure strategy
equilibrium and that, for a given handicap, it is never possible that the handicapped
contestant is awarded the prize when he has the lower valuation. As a result, ineﬃciencies
based on ineﬃcient allocation arise only from the possibility that the favored player is
awarded the contract although his valuation is lower. This ineﬃciency is increasing in
the degree of unfairness (t). On the other hand, total expected eﬀort may decrease in t,
so that there is a potential trade-oﬀ between these two types of social costs.
It may turn out that either a fair contest or no contest at all is the optimal choice for
the authority. Intuitively, the first case is likely whenever social costs are very sensitive
to allocative eﬃciency (e.g. if it is important to award a procurement to the low cost
firm, or to avoid errors in court). By contrast, directly awarding the contract to one
of the contestants (which may be chosen at random) makes sense whenever social costs
focus on the wasteful eﬀort spending (e.g. because opportunity costs are high from a
social point of view as, for instance, in the application procedures for research grants).
In less extreme settings, interior solution may arise, and this may justify unfair contests
as frequently observed in reality. Coming back to the possibility that eﬀort may also be
desirable from a social point of view, a fair contest would always be optimal because it
would lead to ex-post eﬃciency and to maximum eﬀort incentives.
Of course, there may exist additional arguments in the contest designer’s objective
function. For instance, he explicitly wants to support local suppliers, or he believes that
penalizing an innocent defendant is worse than acquitting a defendant who is guilty. Since
there is one degree of freedom when deciding which party to favor, the handicap can be
set to take such issues into account.
19
Appendix
A Proof of Lemma 1
To prove the several characteristics of the equilibrium eﬀort strategies, we proceed in three
steps. First, we show that the structure of the payoﬀ function induces non-decreasing
strategies. Together with continuity, this in turn implies strict monotonicity and therefore
diﬀerentiability and bijectivity on the restricted domain Dbi.
As a first step consider monotonicity. Under slight abuse of notation, for any v0i, vi ∈
[0, 1] with v0i > vi incentive compatibility requires
Πi(bi(vi), vi; t) ≥ Πi(bi(v0i), vi; t)
Πi(bi(v
0
i), v
0
i; t) ≥ Πi(bi(vi), v0i; t)
Taking the sum of both conditions and reordering yields:
Πi(bi(v
0
i), v
0
i; t)−Πi(bi(v0i), vi; t) ≥ Πi(bi(vi), v0i; t)−Πi(bi(vi), vi; t).
Using the explicit structure of the pay-oﬀ function, this leads to
(v01 − v1) Pr(b1(v01) > t · b2) ≥ (v01 − v1) Pr(b1(v1) > t · b2)
(v02 − v2) Pr(b2(v02) >
1
t
· b1) ≥ (v02 − v2) Pr(b2(v2) >
1
t
· b1)
But this only holds if bi(v0i) ≥ bi(vi) which proves monotonicity.
We will prove continuity by contradiction. Assume that b1 is not continuous at x ∈
(0, b1(1)). Stated diﬀerently b1(x) > lim→0b1(x−) ≡ b1(x). This implies, that contestant
2 will not choose some eﬀort level b2 ∈ (b1(x)/t, b1(x)/t) as he can always reduce costs
while the probability of winning the contest remains unchanged. Anticipating this, there
is no reason for contestant 1 to increase eﬀort from b1(x) to b1(x). Hence, we end up with
a contradiction. Note, that the same result can be derived for the continuity of strategies
of the favored player by a permutation of indices and the appropriate modification of
probabilities of winning the contest. Furthermore, as F 0(v) 6= 0 ∀v 6= 0, this result holds
for all v1 ∈ (0, 1].
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Now assume that bi(vi) is not strictly increasing on the restricted domain Dbi. That
means, there is an interval I ⊆ (0, 1] of finite length with bi(vi) ≡ b > 0∀vi ∈ I. Given
such a strategy profile of contestant i, contestant j maximizes his expected payoﬀ as
given by Eqn. (4) or (5). To be specific, let i = 1 and j = 2. Now assume contestant 2
chooses (b− )/t for some valuation v2. Then his pay-oﬀ is
v2 Pr(b−  > b1)− (b− )/t.
Now assume contestant 2 chooses (b+ )/t instead. His expected pay-oﬀ function is then
v2 Pr(b+  > b1)− (b+ )/t
contestant 2 profits from such a deviation as can be seen when → 0
lim
→0
(v2 Pr(b1 > b+ )− (b+ )/t− (v2 Pr(b1 > b− )− (b− )/t))
= lim
→0
(v2(Pr(b1 ∈ [b− , b+ ]))− 2

t
)
= v2 Pr(b1 = b) > 0
Therefore contestant 2 will always exert eﬀort slightly above b/t instead of slightly below,
but that contradicts continuity. Analogously, a gap in eﬀort strategies of contestant
1 can be deduced from a plateau in contestant 2’s equilibrium strategy. This proves
strict monotonicity on the restricted domain. Therefore eﬀort strategies are diﬀerentiable
almost everywhere and a bijection from the restricted domain Dbi onto (0, bi(1)]. Finally,
Dbi has to be non-empty, as it can never be part of an equilibrium that both contestants
or only one contestant choose an eﬀort level of zero for the entire valuation space.
B Proof of Lemma 2
Part i) Clearly, bi(0) = 0 determines the lower bound of DGi. Moreover, denoting
by bmaxi the maximum eﬀort level of contestant i, it follows from Lemma 1 that ρ(b
max
i ) =
max{vi} = 1. This implies that contestant 1 can never be better oﬀ by exerting eﬀort
excessively, i.e. b1 ≤ t·bmax2 has to hold. Analogously, neither will contestant 2 exert more
eﬀort more than necessary to win the contest with probability 1, i.e. b2 ≤ 1t · bmax1 has to
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hold. Of course, this must also be true for bmax1 and b
max
2 , respectively, i.e. b
max
1 ≤ t · bmax2
and bmax2 ≤ 1t · bmax1 must hold. Rearranging yields
bmax2 ≤
1
t
· bmax1 ≤ bmax2
from which it follows that bmax2 =
1
t
· bmax1 or equivalently, bmax1 = t · bmax2 must hold. We
refer to this as the final condition.
Part ii) Follows immediately from our assumptions on F (v) and Lemma 1.
Part iii) Suppose, Gj(0) = g > 0. We show that, for all vi ∈ [0, 1], there is some
positive eﬀort level x > 0 for contestant i such that he is strictly better oﬀ than with
choosing bi = 0: With bi = 0, contestant i’s loses whenever bj > 0 (which happens
with probability (1− g)) wins with probability 1
2
whenever bj = 0 (which happens with
probability g) so that his expected payoﬀ is simply vi · g2 . When choosing a positive eﬀort
level x > 0, he wins with certainty when bj = 0 and, depending on x (and t), may even
win when bj > 0. Thus we have:
Πi(x, ·) = vi ·Gj(x)− x ≥ vi · g − x > vi · g
2
= Πi(0, ·)
where the last inequality holds whenever x < g
2
· vi, so that for all vi > 0, there exist
x > 0 which satisfies this condition.
Part iv) As the first order conditions consist of two ordinary first order diﬀerential
equations which are Lipschitz continuous for vi > 0, any set of initial conditions (bi(vi) =
ci, i = 1, 2) determines unique trajectories bi(vi). In the following, we show that part (i)
and part (iii) together with the so-called no-crossing property of equilibrium eﬀort levels
(see Lizzeri and Persico (2000)) implies, that there is only one admissible set of initial
conditions.
First note, that the final condition in part (i) reduces the freedom to choose initial
conditions by one, as for a given bi(1), bj 6=i(1) is fixed. On the other hand part (iii)
requires that at least one contestant i chooses a finite level of eﬀort for every positive
valuation bi(vi) > 0∀vi > 0.
Consequently, for two sets of initial conditions to coexist, in at least one set one of
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the contestant’s eﬀort-distributions has to have an atom at zero. Furthermore, one of the
two following properties of the corresponding equilibrium eﬀort functions would have to
hold.8 (a) The atom of one contestant’s eﬀort distribution is smaller against a tougher
strategy of his opponent. (b) At least one contestant chooses the same eﬀort for a given
valuation against two distinct opponent’s strategies. In the following we show that none
of the two requirements can be fulfilled in equilibrium.
As to (a), consider the first order conditions for vi given by F (vi) ≡ Gi(0) (contestant
i’s type who only just exerts zero eﬀort) and denoting contestant i’s type who only just
chooses zero eﬀort and a second equilibrium denoted by f(·)
vi
d
db
Gj(0) = 1
evi ddb eGj(0) = 1
But (a) requires that d
db
Gj(0) >
d
db
eGj(0) and vi > evi are satisfied simultaneously which
is a contradiction to the structure of the first order conditions.
A similar argument contradicts (b). The first order conditions 9 for player 1 with
valuation v1 against two distinct strategies of player 2 (once more distinguished by f(·))
v1
d
db1
G2(b1/t) = 1
v1
d
db1
eG2(b1/t) = 1 (31)
can not be fulfilled simultaneously. Therefore coexisting sets of initial conditions are not
feasible.
C Proof of Lemma 3
Using k(v1; t), the first order conditions (9) and (10) can be transformed into a set of
diﬀerential equations expressed in a single variable v1. Substituting k(v1) for v2 in Eqn.
8To see this it suﬃces to plot ρi against bi for i = 1, 2 as detailed in Lizzeri and Persico (2000).
9Once again we restrict ourselves to the favored bidder without loss of generality as the argument is
independent of t.
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(10) yields
v1 · F 0(ρ2(
b1(v1)
t
)) · ρ02(
b1(v1)
t
) · 1
t
= 1 (32)
k(v1) · F 0(ρ1(t · b2(k(v1)))) · ρ01(t · b2(k(v1))) · t = 1. (33)
We can also make use of the identity of the two equations to yield
v1 · F 0(ρ2(
b1
t
)) · ρ02(
b1
t
) · 1
t
= k(v1) · F 0(ρ1(t · b2(k(v1))) · ρ01(t · b2(k(v1)) · t. (34)
Moreover, it follows from the definition of k(·) that
dk(v1; t)
dv1
= ρ02(
b1(v1)
t
) · db1(v1)
dv1
· 1
t
. (35)
Thus, we can re-write Eqn. (34) as
v1 · F 0(k(v1; t)) · dk(v1; t)
dv1
· 1
db1(v1)
dv1
=
k(v1) · F 0(ρ1(tb2(ρ2(
b1(v1)
t
))) · ρ01(tb2(ρ2(
b1(v1)
t
)) · t
⇔ v1 · F 0(k(v1; t)) · dk(v1; t)
dv1
· 1
db1(v1)
dv1
= k(v1) · F 0(ρ1(b1)) · ρ01(b1) · t
⇔ v1 · F 0(k(v1; t)) · dk(v1; t)
dv1
= k(v1) · F 0(v1) · ρ01(b1) ·
db1(v1)
dv1
· t. (36)
Finally, as ρ1(b1(v1)) = v1, it follows that ρ
0
1(b1) =
dv1
db1
which implies that ρ01(b1) · db1(v1)dv1 =
1. Hence, we end up with a single ordinary diﬀerential equation
dk(·; t)
dv1
=
t · k(v1; t) · F 0(v1)
v1 · F 0(k(v1; t)) , (37)
where the boundary condition k(1; t) ≡ 1 and our assumptions on F (v) guarantee a
unique solution for k(·). Analogously, we get
dk−1(·; t)
dv2
=
k−1(v2; t) · F 0(v2)
t · v2 · F 0(k−1(v2; t)) . (38)
24
To derive a solution in closed form, we separate dependent and independent variables of
diﬀerential equations (37) and (38) to yield
dk
k
F 0(k) = t
dv1
v1
F 0(v1) (39)
dk−1
k−1
F 0(k−1) =
dv2
v2
F 0(v2). (40)
With H(x) =
R 1
x
F 0(y)
y
dy, integration yields
H(k) = tH(v1) (41)
H(k−1) =
1
t
H(v2) (42)
which is equivalent to k(v1; t) = H−1(tH(v1)) and k−1(v2; t) = H−1(1tH(v2)) as stated in
the Lemma. Finally note that, by definition, H(1) = 0 so that H−1(0) = 1. As t →∞,
k−1(v2; ·)→ 1. This also implies that contestant 2 will be the winner with probability 1
when t → ∞: To see this, note that contestant 2 wins whenever v1 ≤ k−1(v2; t) which
occurs with probability F (k−1(v2; t)) and which tends to 1 as t → ∞. Analogously,
contestant 1 wins whenever v2 ≤ k(v1; t) which occurs with probability F (k(v1; t)) and
which must tend to zero as t→∞ and thus limt→∞ k(v1; t) = 0 must hold.
D Proof of Theorem 1
Recall that the derivative of the equilibrium eﬀort strategy with respect to v1 must satisfy
db1(v1)
dv1
= 1
ρ01(b1)
. Moreover, using the definition of k(·), we have ρ01(b1) = ρ01(t · b2(k(v1; t)))
such that db1(v1)
dv1
= 1
ρ01(t·b2(k(v1;t))) holds. From Eqn. (33) it also follows that
1
ρ01(t · b2(k(v1; t))
= t · k(v1; t) · F 0(v1) (43)
must hold in equilibrium so that we have
db1(v1)
dv1
= t · k(v1; t) · F 0(v1). (44)
25
Together with b1(max{0, k−1(0; t)}) = 0 and the definition of k(v1; t), closed form solu-
tions for the equilibrium eﬀort strategies are given by
b∗1(v1) =
v1Z
max{0,k−1(0)}
t · k(V ; t) · dF (V ) (45)
b∗2(v2) =
b∗1(k
−1(v2))
t
(46)
as stated in the Theorem.
E Proof of Theorem 2
Part i) As for the first case, in any BNE, contestant 1 loses the contest whenever
b∗1(v1) < t · b∗2(v2) ⇔ v2 > k(v1; t) which simply follows from the definition of k(v1; t):
Since k(v1; t) gives that type of contestant 2 who bids 1t−times as much as contestant 1
(which would result in a tie), contestant 1 loses the contest whenever v2 > k(v1; t). To
have an ineﬃcient allocation, also v1 > v2 must hold. As we have seen for the symmetric
case with t = 1, H−1(H(v1)) = v1 leads to k(v1; 1) = v1. Since it has been shown in
Lemma 3 that k(v1; t) is decreasing in t, it follows that for all t > 1 there exist v1, v2 such
that v2 > k(v1; t) even when v1 > v2. Therefore the joint event {v2 > k(v1; t)}∧{v1 > v2}
has positive probability.
Contrary to that consider the second case: contestant 2 loses whenever b∗2(v2) <
1
t
· b∗1(v1)⇔ k−1(v2; t) < v1. Again, for this outcome to be ineﬃcient, we must also have
v2 > v1. For t = 1 we get k−1(v2; 1) = v2. However, contrary to the first case, since
k−1(v2; t) is increasing in t (see Lemma 3 again). Therefore, for all t > 1 the joint event
{k−1(v2; t) < v1} ∧ {v2 > v1} has probability measure zero.
Part ii) Note that for all v1, k(v1; t) ≤ v1 holds as for t = 1, we have k(v1; 1) = v1,
and k(v1; t) was shown to be decreasing in t (see Lemma 3). In Eqn. (14) for each v1,
F (v1) is the probability that contestant 1 has the higher valuation, while the probability
that contestant 1 is the winner is only F (k(v1; t)) ≤ F (v1) so that by integrating over all
v1, the result follows. Moreover, for t = 1, we have k(v1; t) = v1 so that the integrand in
Eqn. (14) is zero. For the derivative w.r.t. t, we have d
dt
p∗(·) =
1R
0
−F 0(k(v1; t)dk(·)dt dv1 > 0
as we have shown in Lemma (3) that k(·) is decreasing in t. Finally, we know from Lemma
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3, part iii) that contestant 2’s probability of winning tends to 1 as t → ∞. It remains
to show that contestant 2 has the lower valuation with probability 1
2
: Since for each v1,
Pr(v2 ≤ v1) is F (v1), taking expectations over v1 yields
R 1
0
F (v1)F
0(v1)dv1. Integration
by parts then gives
Z 1
0
F (v1)F
0(v1)dv1 = F (v1)2
¯¯1
0
−
Z 1
0
F (v1)F
0(v1)dv1
= 1−
Z 1
0
F (v1)F
0(v1)dv1 ⇔
2
Z 1
0
F (v1)F
0(v1)dv1 = 1⇔
Z 1
0
F (v1)F
0(v1)dv1 =
1
2
.
F Proof of Lemma 4
Part (i) As we already saw in Lemma 3 that dk(v1;t)
dt
< 0, Part (i) follows directly
from
dΠ
dt
=
d
dt
Z 1
0
Z v1
k(v1;t)
φ(v)F 0(v2)dv2F 0(v1)dv1
= −
Z 1
0
µ
φ(|k(v1; t)− v1|)F 0(k(v1; t))dk(v1; t)
dt
¶
F 0(v1)dv1 (47)
which is strictly positive as long as t ∈ (0,∞) (as k(v1; t) < v1 in this case and, further-
more F 0(.) > 0 for v ∈ (0, 1) by assumption). dΠ
dt
= 0 if t = 1 as v = 0 in this case.
Furthermore limt→∞ dΠdt = 0 as we already saw in Lemma 3 that limt→∞ k(v1; t) = 0 which
implies that limt→∞
dk(v1;t)
dt
= 0.
Part(ii) and (iii) This given, we are left with the proof that dΨ
dt
vanishes if t = 1
or t →∞. Note that we can restrict ourselves to an investigation of dΣ
dt
as Ψ0(.) > 0 by
assumption. It will prove useful to rewrite b2(v2) as follows. Analogously to the proof of
Theorem 1, we can extract the slope of b2(v2) through
db2(v2)
dv2
=
1
ρ02(b2)
=
1
ρ02(b1(k−1(v2; t))/t)
=
1
t
k−1(v2; t)F
0(ρ2(b1(k
−1(v2; t))/t))
=
1
t
k−1(v2; t)F
0(v2) (48)
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where the first row follows from the definition of k−1(.) and the consecutive step uses
Eqn. (9). The last row is an application of the definition of k−1(v2; t). Then, b2(v2) is
given by
b2(v2) =
Z v2
max{k(0;t),0}
1
t
k−1(V ; t)F 0(V )dV (49)
With an index permutation dΣ
dt
can be rewritten as10
dΣ
dt
=
Z 1
0
Z v1
0
µ
k(v2; t)−
1
t2
k−1(v2; t) + t
dk(v2; t)
dt
+
1
t
dk−1(v2; t)
dt
¶
F 0(v2)dv2F 0(v1)dv1.
(50)
This expression, however, vanishes at t = 1 and for t → ∞. To see this recall that
k(v; 1) = k−1(v; 1) = v, dk(v;t)
dt
|t=1 = −dk−1(v;t)dt |t=1, limt→∞ k(v; t) = 0, and limt→∞ k−1(v; t) =
1 (see Lemma 3).
10For the ease of exposition, we neglect the max{k−1(0; t), 0} term and its analogue for b2(v2) in the
equilibrium bid functions, as it is easy to show that this is without impact on the t-dependence.
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